[NTLUG:Discuss] Last meeting, you CAN have hotplugged devices automount without desktop

Chris Cox cjcox at acm.org
Mon Jan 28 13:48:15 CST 2008


Ted Gould wrote:
> On Fri, 2008-01-25 at 18:37 -0600, Chris Cox wrote:
>> AppArmor is simple... but may die just because.
> 
> Perhaps, the reality is that if you have SELinux, AppArmor is really a
> subset.
> 
>> SELinux... sheesh...
>> must die.  
> 
> Is unlikely to ever happen as many Gov't contracts require this level of
> security.  I actually believe that this level of security will catch on
> in corporate culture as soon as "CEO Magazine" publishes an article
> something like this:
> 
> IT worker finds out about layoff by reading CEO's e-mail.

Sure, in a niche application, anything is possible.  But configuration
at a fine granularity >99% (IMHO) leads to lack of use.

> 
> -- or --
> 
> Whistle blower in IT department tells police how truly evil executives
> are by reading their e-mail.

Oh.. and of course those trivial examples are easily done without
something like SELinux.

> 
> They'll want a security policy that allows someone to administer a
> machine without being able to read the data on it.

That's merely just protecting the data... again, don't need
SELinux for that.

> 
>> We'll have to see how PolicyKit comes out.  I may be
>> very useful.  Or it could be the UCE of Linux, not enough
>> benefit to be useful (especially if painful to configure or if
>> it doesn't make sense).
> 
> Considering that PolicyKit is mostly targeting desktop policy, I doubt
> that most of the configurations will be very complex.  Mostly I see the
> PolicyKit settings to be "If local user" and "If an administrator."  The
> big gains with policy kit become the removal of gtksu and friends as an
> easy attack vector.

Agreed, I can see that... but it's certainly not going to solve
the device problem.  Might move it around a bit.

Of course, now it sounds like PolicyKit is just another (unneeded) layer
on top of SELinux, sudo, etc.  Sigh.  Time better spent fixing
flat tires rather than replacing the good ones with even better ones.




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